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File cc USSS

23 JUN 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August 1972) Conventions

1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive Director/Comptroller.

2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is contained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI Staff to the DCI which was concurred in by the ADDP and approved by the DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).

JFK (1)(B)

3. On 13 April 1972 the [COS, WH/Miami] met with the Miami USSS representative and Mr. Mastrovito of USSS Headquarters to discuss preliminary planning for [Station WH/Miami] support to the USSS prior to and during subject conventions. On 17 April 1972 the [C/WH/COG and C/CI/LSN] met with Mr. Mastrovito at Headquarters to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the USSS. JFK (1)(B) JFK (1)(B)

4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS and Headquarters representatives provided that:

JFK (1)(B) a. [Station WH/Miami] would conduct name traces on all Cubans of interest to the USSS.

b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.

c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during the convention periods. This would include briefings on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which could affect the security of the conventions.

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d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States would be the responsibility of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly targeted against these groups since it was now considered an internal security function.

JFK(1)(B) 5. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffer office of [Station WH/Miami] with the USSS Chief of Communications, Station personnel and a Headquarters representative. It was agreed that name traces would be handled by Miami security field office courier from the USSS to buffer office until the USSS established communications links from their command post in convention center, at which time trace requests would be sent from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA Headquarters. Cuban name traces are relayed to [Station WH/Miami] JFK(1)(B) by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted [by WH/COG.] JFK(1)(B) Replies to USSS requests on non-Cubans are coordinated with [CI/SO.] JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B) 6. [Station WH/Miami] has arranged the rental of a safehouse [about five minutes from convention center] which will provide a secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both conventions. A Headquarters officer will TDY [to Miami] prior to JFK(1)(B) the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to assist the Station in providing the support described in paragraph four above.

JFK(1)(B)

7. [Station WH/Miami] is in daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing buffer office as a meeting site when necessary. The JFK(1)(B) location of [Station WH/Miami] has not been revealed to the USSS. (Station is located some distance from buffer office.) JFK(1)(B) Additionally, the [Miami Security Field Office] maintains normal liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.

8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.

SECRET

00577

May 1973

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI. These funds may still be possibly held in a special account for that use. This is one of the areas where TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would have the details as this was handled through the Executive Director's office and of course Angleton would have additional information.

Signed
[illegible]

Chief
Missions and Programs Staff

67

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EYES ONLY
SECRET

00582

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment to the Agency

1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject:

a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director Helms.

b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI, General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation). Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.

3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involvement of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this subject died down and we did not pursue it further.

4. Please return the attachments when they have served your purpose.

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5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff prepared by [Richard Ober.] The original meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr. Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always possible that he might draw in the Agency. JFK (1)(B)

6. Before appointing [Ober] to the IES Staff as the Agency representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings presided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inexperience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from the Bureau.

JFK (1)(B)

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments (5)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Counter Intelligence Staff, [Police Group] Activities JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B)

1. Counter Intelligence Staff, [Police Group] (CI/[PG]) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and programs involving assistance [to foreign police/security forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and programs for intelligence purposes.] JFK(1)(B)

2. CI/[PG] JFK(1)(B) maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development (OPS/AID) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (IPA). JFK(1)(B) CI/[PG] also administers and supervises Project IDEN-171 and its training proprietary facility, IDEN-172. IDEN-168 In addition, CI/PG coordinates a joint [OPS/AID Technical Services Division, Central Intelligence Agency (TSD/CIA) Technical Investigations Course.] JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B) CI/[PG] provides guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertaining JFK(1)(B) to [police/security functions and activities.] Specific details of these functions are as follows:

LIAISON WITH OPS/AID

JFK(1)(B) CI/[PG] liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a daily basis and consists principally of:

A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are of interest to Agency components,

B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored participants in IPA/OPS/AID training programs,

C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AID briefings and tours for [foreign police/security representatives sponsored by CIA Area Divisions,] JFK(1)(B)

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D. obtaining biographic and assessment data on IPA/OPS/AID trainees,

E. providing general information pertaining to police/security organizations, activities, equipment, and personalities requested by Agency operating components,

F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the Technical Investigations Course designed to familiarize the trainees with the technique required to properly investigate terrorist activities wherein explosives have been utilized, JFK (1)(B)

G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve abroad. At one time as many as 50 CIA employees were covered in Latin America, the Far East and Africa. This total has been reduced during the past several years to 10 serving in Thailand, * JFK (1)(B)

H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID sponsored participants.

PROJECT IDEN-171 - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172 - training function of IDEN-168

IDEN-172 Training Academy is a commercial interprise. It was incorporated under the laws of the State of Maryland in 1952 and conducts its business in the District of Colombia. It is engaged principally in training foreign police/security personnel under an overt contract with OPS/AID, and selling police/security equipment to foreign police/security personnel and organizations. IDEN-172 also provides special training programs and briefings to foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency operating divisions. It provides biographic and assessment data on trainees to country desks. Recently IDEN-172 has acquired the capability of providing training to foreign police/security personnel in VIP protective security for Chiefs of State. JFK (1)(B)

* CIA personnel under this cover will not be replaced as such and all will be phased out by June 1974. JFK (1)(B)

COMMENT

CI/PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison with any law enforcement organization, local or federal, at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or IDEN-172 without divulging Agency interest. OPS/AID has such contacts at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities (training of foreign police/security personnel at home and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the world. IDEN-172 has such contacts at home - local and federal level - because its personnel are personally acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the United States. Members of the IDEN-172 staff (not identified as CIA) have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.

JFK (1)(B) JFK(1)(B) JFK (1)(B) JFK(1)(B)

3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varying degrees with foreign police/security organizations through its field stations. The existence and extent thereof, however, is a decision to be made by the Area Division, and is not the responsibility of CI/PG. JFK (1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

4. The CIA station as a member of the Country Team in Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had some contact with Dan Mitrione, who was murdered by the Tupamaros. Dan Mitrione, an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, was a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.

JFK(1)(B)

JFK(1)(B)

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

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May 73

SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program

1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.

2. The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:

a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.

b. Americans with existing extremist credentials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information responsive to MHCHAOS program requirements, as well as other Agency requirements. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their background and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.

3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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CORPORATE COVER

JFK (1)(B)

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.S. This process involves the selection of companies; research on their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency; arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the companies, including letters of understanding; funding of salaries, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitoring of each integrated case throughout the course of the cover use. The overall objective is to match the individual being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and protection of the company integrity.

2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in 47 foreign countries and 12 are located in the United States. To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are researching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies at any given time.

3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has been established policy that no more than two individuals would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total number of companies now being used and efforts are underway to effect further reductions toward the goal of one individual per company.

4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function described in paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing contact with two U.S. car rental firms and two U.S. credit card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit cards in alias for operational use in the United States and abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being used by 34 individuals.

JFK (1)(4)

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DEVISED FACILITIES COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-stopped notional facilities which were created to provide cover for Agency personnel in the United States and abroad and to provide an attributable source for Agency funds used in operations and requiring concealment of Agency or U.S. Government interest. The facilities comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover, payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscellaneous support such as title to property, funding, etc.; 61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207 non-registered companies providing support for high risk operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reimbursements, and proprietary funding.

2. 224 Agency personnel engaged in operational activities are payrolled by the facilities, an essential procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salaries without documenting the Agency as the source.

3. The facilities provide a capability for passing Agency funds to 30 Agency proprietaries and 97 bona fide companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts located in 36 banks throughout the United States provide the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.

JFK 1(B)

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.
1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

DATE: July 24, 1975

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 190 pages extracted from a 693-page document prepared by CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities cited in this document include references to Bureau operations of an extremely sensitive nature, and it was also noted that the Senate Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved.

This is to advise that the following pages from the document were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:

General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354

Laboratory Division - Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221, 222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were furnished for information purposes as these pages contained information concerning techniques used and/or developed by CIA which may be of interest).

Intelligence Division
Section CI-1
Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, 77, 136, 140-142, 298, 329, 582, 615, and 628.

REC-88 62-116395-441

3 JUL 31 1975

62-116395

TJM:ekw (12)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUL 31 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Section CI-2
Pages 30 and 329

Section CI-3
Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363, 368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 591-593, and 615.

Section IS-1
Pages 188, 189, 283, 330

Section IS-2
Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203, 330, and 482.

Section IS-3
Pages 521 and 549

Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.

ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requested assessment.

JFK (1)(b)

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the information contained therein should be closely guarded and disclosed only on a need-to-know basis.

TJM

[illegible] FILE ONLY

[PROJECT ~~MOCKINGBIRD~~]

[Project ~~Mockingbird~~] a telephone intercept activity, was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

JFK(1A) Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections were established with the assistance of a telephone company official who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence Houston).

JFK(1B) The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members, of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

JFK(1B) Since the termination of [Project ~~Mockingbird~~,] those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.

62-116395-475 000022

ENCLOSURE

SECRET EYES ONLY

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: Soviet Defector

A Soviet defector, defected to a representative of this Agency in 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-house in Maryland, where he was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote wooded area at ISOLATION. The SR Division was convinced that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their contention and he was confined at ISOLATION in an effort to convince him to "confess."

This Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency's position in handling a defector under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the responsibility for his further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor. The Soviet defector was moved to a comfortable safehouse in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr. Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

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EYES ONLY

valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution of Soviet recruited agents -in several countries throughout the world. He currently is living under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed, and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states "while I regret my years of incarceration, I have no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."

I. SURVEILLANCES

A. ~~SIESTA~~

JFK(1)(A)

During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May, and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emotionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files, and that employees were visiting a photographic studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance, one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez was aborted because of a door lock problem.

B. ~~PARAGON~~

JFK(1)(B)

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69 and her associates at various times from May to September 1971. Iden 69, an acknowledged Latin American revolutionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap ~~Vice President~~ Agnew and the ~~DCI~~. Surveillances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69 during two visits to the United States, technical coverage of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives in New York City, and surveillance, including mail coverage, of several American citizens alleged to be part of the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.

C. ~~CELOTEX I~~

JFK(1)(C)

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post during

JFK(1)(D)

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the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971 and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be maintained of the building housing his office. The surveillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources of classified information of interest to the Agency which had appeared in a number of his columns.

D. MUDHEN

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.

E. ~~BUTANE~~

JFK(1)(B)

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to 20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articles exposing Agency operations.

II. POLICE SUPPORT

JFK (1)(C)

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police Department was provided a communications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned by two Agency employees, as well as a representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations.

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B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the ~~Metropolitan~~ Police Department, Fairfax County, ~~Virginia~~, Police Department, Montgomer~~y County, Maryland,~~ Police Department, ~~New York City Pol~~ice Department, and the ~~San Francisco, Californi~~a, Police Department.

III. GENERAL SUPPORT

A. ~~SRPOINTER~~

Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished.

B. ~~AELADLE~~

For several years the Office of Security has provided support to a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted of numerous things, including documentation for a change of identity on three occasions.

C. ~~REDFACE I~~

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and

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sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe within the vault. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information in his possession.

D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

In January 1971, the Director approved a request from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of Security operating in Falls Church, Virginia. Support includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, medical clearance, and training. It has been divided into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place individuals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3) Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD. In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reimbursable basis.

E. KITTENS PROJECT

As a result of a request from the Department of State, approved by the DCI, this office has, since October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis to two sons of a foreign leader who are attending school in the United States. This support includes the financing of the protection and the detail to the Department of State of six armed Agents of this office who are documented as State Department Office of Security employees.

F. ~~MERRIMAG~~

From February 1967 to November 1971, an Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring

JFK(1)(C)

dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents so successfully penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.

G. F. ~~ANTLERS~~

JFK(1)(C)

Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff, and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European country via commercial transportation and gain entry into the United States without leaving any trace of his true identity.

11 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey

1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current interest.

2. The principal object of Security's interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also subsequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

00053

E IMPDET CL BY

5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-Castro organizations [illegible] this country. There are al[illegible] reports that his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the principal informant.

7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent contact with her friend, the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees except social contacts.

8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelligence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security. As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation.

9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watchful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he continues to see them socially. Thus, there is slim reason to believe that further waiting will produce a break in the case.

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now. It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's operation.

11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly. The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing information on [CIA's Soviet operations] is too great to warrant further delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any possible gains from continuing this CI effort.

~~John O. Lawrence~~

SECRET

00061

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services

SUBJECT : Press Allegations re Use of Agency Polygraph

1. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier today.

2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized disclosure of classified information and directed a sweeping investigation within the United States Government to determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

JFK(i)(C)

3. On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--one individual in the Department of Defense and three individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect in the Department of Defense.

4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time in matters involving the national security the Agency had detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for his use in polygraphing State Department employees who were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty. I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's approval and that State clearly understood that the examination was their total responsibility. I further informed him that this was the only way we could undertake to entertain his request and that even then it would require the specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with Mr. Gentile.

5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made. Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect. Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph examination.

6. The four individuals were Iden 182 of the Department of Defense and Iden 183, Iden 184, and Iden 185 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering memorandum is attached.

7. Iden 186, a staff writer for The Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971, stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency. Speculation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so, press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State Department Security officials utilizing an operator and a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to Iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was the source.

JFK (1)(A)

Howard J. Osborn
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security

Attachment

5 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 1973

JFK(1A)

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."

2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriated for CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building.

There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, political action influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

00070

SECRET-EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED BY
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (3).
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply additional detail. He said Senator Russell and Representative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but asked not to be briefed in detail.

JFK(1)

John G. Richards
~~John G. Richards~~
Inspector

Attachment

00071

SECRET-EYES ONLY

9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Per your instructions

1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record.

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully conversant are:

JFK(1)(A) -- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/O.

-- ~~WH~~BRINEY and ~~MHMUTUAL~~ investments and accumulation of Government capital.

JFK(1)(C) -- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U. S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U. S.

-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. trip to SEA.

JFK(1)(C)

Red White - DCI Files

John M. Clarke

JFK(1)(A)

00072

EYES ONLY
SECRET

E 2 IMPDET CL BY

5 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 1973

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."

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There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

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CLASSIFIED BY [illegible]
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 [illegible]
[illegible]

00073

SECRET-EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown in other documents in the Agency. It has been kept very close with Mr. Yale, Mr. Magnusson, and possibly Mr. Colby. All files have been purged.

00076

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 AUG 54 (47)

07 MAY 1973

JFK(1)(b)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Management and Services

FROM : Director of Finance

SUBJECT : Special Other Government Agency Activities

1. Project ~~MHDOZEN~~ - Colonel White, Executive Director-Comptroller, acting for the Director, authorized the Director of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate $2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by the Chief, CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still active.

2. ~~LPMEDLEY~~ - Rental of office space in New York City for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella, Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.

3. Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable and non-reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

4. Project TWOFOLD - Reimbursement from Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by a domestic Agency Security proprietary.

5. Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of $858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans.

E2 IMPDET JFK(1)(A)
CL BY: 006567

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET EYES ONLY

00077

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Special Report

1. This memorandum is in response to a request to provide information on situations or associations that might appear to be irregular on the surface.

2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Background: For many years the Central Intelligence Agency has detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate office of the President such as the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries, clerical employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP. I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds were apparently available to run the White House and most of our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees. CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and others on Defense and State and other Government entities whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

In addition to the above, we have technical specialists detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and security officers detailed to the Department of State to

CONFIDENTIAL E 2 IMPDET CI By 003955

JFK(1)(A)

protect foreign visitors. Recently, [John Ha[illegible]] was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury along with four other Agency employees. We have even, in rare instances, detailed our people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.

3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies - Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served for over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or other Government agency has been carefully considered and approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were involved.

4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of reporting "too much," I would remind you that Contract Personnel Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American firms to provide cover for Agency assets. The actual assignments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped, in the main, in the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

00106

J4K(2b)

4 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

1. This memorandum contains information for the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the request of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief description of each action involved and then have included the name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for the requests for action by this Office will have to be determined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows:

a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedicated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore, Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to obtain such materiel without associating the procurement action with the United States Government. It is legally necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.

00110

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EYES ONLY
SECRET OL 3-2758

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 001777

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary and have assisted us in obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too, have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary.

b. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of the U. S. Code (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship to the United States Government is made. In order for the Agency to covertly obtain such equipment and hide any Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff of the Procurement Division has relied on an established working relationship with a U.S. firm. This firm, a prominent supplier located in Maryland, deals in a wide range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment. The Covert Procurement Staff has had a relationship with an officer in the firm for over 15 years. The officer agreed to allow us to place orders through his corporation to major suppliers of this equipment with a billing to an Agency national proprietary. There is an understanding that if any inquiry is raised by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact the Department of Justice, identify the Agency's interest in the procurement action, and clear the officer of any responsibility. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry about the proprietary from an FBI agent making a routine investigation of the officer's books. Through Office of Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI, the agent was informed that it is an Agency notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry. Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit requisitions to us to acquire [surveillance] equipment. The majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelligence service with whom liaison is conducted in various foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

EYES ONLY
SECRET

7. Contractual Relationship - USJPRS: The Agency organization, USJPRS, has a contractual association with approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research Service) is a part of FBIS. They perform a translation service of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated" into the Bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C. They are paid and administered by the Bureau. CIA reimburses the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared in Contract Personnel Division.

8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency.

Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38 of EEAB received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Iden 38 if he had a retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks. Iden 38 sent him a resume on Thomas Amato who retired 31 July 1971. Iden 38 did not document his EEAB record to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between March and May 1972.

JFK (1)(A)

All of the above information was reported to the Office of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.

9. Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to McCord, but Lambert was not hired.

In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had

CONFIDENTIAL

00107

not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from the D.C. area.) He said he had been visited by a Special Agent of the FBI who told Lambert that his resume had been found among McCord's papers. The Agent wanted to know if Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him, Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29 OS were notified immediately.

JFK(DA)

Harry B. Fisher

Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61

1. Information has been received from WH Division which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61 on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. The Iden 76 Desk of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that time.

2. I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66 of CI Staff (Red 1731), who advised that the FBI did have coverage of Identity 61, and the Agency supported this operation. He indicated that this was identified as Operation WUDCOR and he would be able to provide additional details on this if Mr. Colby requests it.

JFK (1)(B)

/s/ Identity 10

Acting Executive Officer

CONFIDENTIAL

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 008246

00371

JFK(1)(B) DO/D2 [illegible]

8 MAR 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: WH Comments on Jack Anderson Column

REFERENCE: Jack Anderson's Washington Merry-Go-Round Column of 8 March 1973: "Chilean Break-ins Reflect Watergate"

1. WH Division has reviewed the referenced column (copy attached) by Jack Anderson and finds that it contains no new information. To the best knowledge of the Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that E. Howard Hunt was engaged on behalf of ITT in breaking into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and New York.

2. Any connection between ITT and these break-ins is purely conjectural and the column takes care to point this out.

3. Harold Hendrix, ITT Latin American representative, has told us that he had no relationship with Hunt on this or any ITT matter. He had anticipated that Anderson might imply such a relationship in his column and had assured us that this was not true.

/s/ Identity 81

Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment: As Stated

DECLASSIFIED BY 9803 RDD/gcl ON 3/12/94 ... per GMB ... (JFK)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
GMB 3/3/94
(9803 RDD/gcl 3/17/94 JFK)

JFK (1)(A)

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 001304

00373

USSS-EPS FORM 101
6/70

EXECUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE
INCIDENT REPORT

1. SERIAL (CASE) NUMBER	FM-72-398
2. DATE OCCUR.	05-13-72 05-15-72
3. HOUR OCCUR.	Unknown

4. LOCATION (NATION)	(STREET ADDRESS)	5. NATURE OF INCIDENT
Chile	1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.	Burglary II

6. REPORTED BY:	7. ADDRESS	8. HOME PHONE	9. OFFICE PHONE
Hernan Navarro	1706 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va.	321-7121	785-1746

10. OFFICE ASSIGNED	11. DATE	12. HOUR	13. DAY OF WEEK
Sergeant Stevens E. Butler Sergeant Riley M. Richardson	05-15-72	1330 hrs.	(1) (S) (2) (M) 3 T 4 W 5 T 6 F (7) (S)

14. WITNESS	15. ADDRESS	16. HOME PHONE	17. OFFICE PHONE
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

18. WITNESS	19. ADDRESS	20. HOME PHONE	21. OFFICE PHONE
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT (BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT. CONTINUE ABOVE ITEMS AS NECESSARY INDICATING ITEM)

At approximately 1330 hours, Monday, May 13, 1972, Foreign Missions Division-Control Center was advised by M.P.D.C., 3D, that a burglary had taken place at the Chancery of Chile, 1736 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., sometime between 1600 hours on Friday, May 13, 1972, and on 0855 hours this date.

Sergeant Riley M. Richardson and the undersigned were dispatched at approximately 1335 hours in Cruiser # 23.

The undersigned was advised by Mr. Hernan (NMI) Navarro, Administrative Counselor of the Embassy of Chile, that the Chancery of Chile was entered and all the offices were ransacked. At this time the method of entry or items taken is unknown. Mr. Navarro advises that he will contact the Foreign Missions Division-Watch Commander when determination of missing articles is made. (continued)

jam

(USE EPS FORM 102 - SUPPLEMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS)

23. PHOTOS ☐ YES ☒ NO
FS#

24. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
(1)				
	RACE / SEX / HEIGHT / WEIGHT / HAIR / EYES		DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO. / NATIONALITY
(2)				
	RACE / SEX / HEIGHT / WEIGHT / HAIR / EYES		DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO. / NATIONALITY

25. ARREST PD	26. ARREST NO.	27. ARREST OFFICER (NAME AND BADGE NO.)	28. DATE OF ARREST	29. HOUR

30. INCIDENT STATUS A. ☒ OPEN B. ☒ CLOSED C. ☐ UNFOUNDED D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST

31. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE), HOUR	DATE / HOUR	32. APPROVING OFFICIAL (SIGNATURE)	DATE / HOUR
Sgt. Stevens E. Butler Sergeant Stevens E. Butler	05-15-72 1500 hrs.	Pete N. Manthos Captain Pete N. Manthos	05-15-72 1500

33. STATE DEPT. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED	DATE: / HOUR:	34. USSS-ID CASE NO.
N/A		N/A

00376

INCIDENT REPORT - SUPPLEM

1. SERIAL (CASE) NUMBER
FM-72-393

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT			
Burglary II			
3. REPORTED BY:	4. ADDRESS	5. HOME PHONE	321-7727
Hernan (MT) Navarro	7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va	6. OFFICE PHONE	765-1716

7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:

The following were previously on the scene: Sergeant Clifton O. Gill, Badge # 147, M.P.D.C.,3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, M.P.D.C.,3D, also M.P.D.C Print Cruiser # 735.

S/A Michael F. Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

jam

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC.

N/A

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS				
(1)								
	RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS				
(2)								
	RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

9. ARREST PD	10. ARREST NO.	11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)	12. DATE	13. HOUR

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSITION	15. USSS-ID CASE NO.
A. ☒ OPEN B. ☐ CLOSED C. ☐ UNFOUNDED D. ☐ CLEARED BY ARREST	N/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION

OPEN

00377

17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE)	18. DATE	19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)	20. DATE
Sgt. Stevens E. Butler SEB Sergeant Stevens E. Butler	05-15-72	Pete N. Manthos Captain Pete N. Manthos	05-[illegible]

11-72-[illegible]

2. NATURE OF INCIDENT
Burglary II

3. REPORTED BY:	4. ADDRESS	5. HOME PHONE / 6. OFFICE PHONE
Herman (PET) Navarro	7605 Hamlet Street, Springfield, Va	321-7721 / 785-1746

7. ADDITIONAL DETAILS OF INCIDENT:

At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 16, 1972, Mr. Navarro contacted Officer Adrian Roman-Gonzalez at 1310 L. Street, N.W. and stated the following items missing: (4 Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo AM/FM Portable Radio, two (2) Panasonic AM/FM Radi[os] and one (1) Westinghouse AM/FM/SW Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver, one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an unknown number of books.

jam

8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY NAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER, DOB, EYES, ETC. N/A

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
(1)				

RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

	LAST NAME	FIRST	MIDDLE	ADDRESS
(2)				

RACE	SEX	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	HAIR	EYES	DATE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	NATIONALITY

9. ARREST PD	10. ARREST NO.	11. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE NO.)	12. DATE	13. HOUR

14. CURRENT CASE DISPOSTION
A. [X] OPEN   B. [X] CLOSED   C. [ ] UNFOUNDED   D. [ ] CLEARED BY ARREST

15. USSS-ID CASE NO. N/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION
OPEN

00378

17. REPORTING OFFICER (SIGNATURE)	18. DATE	19. APPROVED (SIGNATURE & TITLE)	20. DATE
Sgt. Stevens E. Butler (signature) Sergeant Stevens E. Butler	05-15-72	Pete N. Manthos (signature) Captain Pete N. Manthos	05-1[illegible]

PERSON OR PROPER...	Embassy OF Chile	248-42

14. EX. COPIES	15. DIST.	16. BEAT	17. R.A.	3. STREET ADDRESS	4. HOME PHONE
1	3D			1736 MASS. Ave N.W.	N/A

18. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS EMPLOYED	5. WHERE EMPLOYED OR SCHOOL ATTENDING	6. BUS. PHONE
N/A	N/A	785-174

19. DESCRIBE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PREMISE	7. SEX	RACE	DOB	8. CRIME
Chile Embassy				Burg. II

20. VEHICLE USED - TAG NO. AND STATE	9. LOCATION OF CRIME (Address)	10. DATE, DAY, TIME
N/A	1736 MASS. Ave N.W.	See Item 36

21. YEAR / MAKE / MODEL / COLOR(S)	11. WEAPON, TOOL, FORCE OR MEANS USED	PHOTOS ☐ YES ☐ NO FS #
	UNK	

CODE: O—OWNER R - REPORTING PERSON C—COMPLAINANT P - PARENT/GUAR	12. METHOD USED	13. CLASSIFICATION
	UNK	

22. NAME (Last, First, Middle)	CODE	RES. ADDRESS	HOME PHONE	BUS. PHONE
NAVARRO, HERNAN	R	7605 Hamlet St. Springfield VA	321-7121	785-17..
23. Administrative Counselor				
24.				

25. IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUMBER (Include Name, Address, Sex, Race, Age, Height, Weight, Eyes, Hair, Clothing etc.) IF ARRESTED GIVE ARREST NUMBER AND CHARGE (Omit description if arrested)

(1) N/A

(2)

26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION ON BODY	27. HOSPITALIZED - WHERE? ☐ ADMIT ☐ RELEASED
N/A	N/A
28. TRANSPORTED BY	29. TREATED BY
N/A	N/A

30. TYPE OF PROPERTY TAKEN	31. LOSS VALUE	32. TRADEMARKS, ACTIONS OR CONVERSATION OF SUSPECT
UNK.	UNK	N/A
33. EXACT LOCATION OF PROPERTY	34. POINT OF ENTRY	35. VEHICLE FROM WHICH THEFT OCCURRED / TAG NO. / STATE / YEAR AND MAKE
Inside Embassy	UNK	N/A

36. NARRATIVE: (1) CONTINUATIONS OF ABOVE ITEMS (QUOTE ITEM NUMBER) INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SUSPECTS AS OUTLINED ABOVE. (2) BRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT AND ACTION TAKEN. (3) DESCRIBE EVIDENCE AND PROPERTY INDICATE DISPOSITION AND DESCRIBE ALL PROPERTY INVOLVED. USE CONTINUATION REPORT IF MORE SPACE IS NEEDED. RECORD VALUE OF LOSS ESTIMATED BY VICTIM.

ITEM NO.

R-1 Reports Between The hours of 1600, 5-15-72 And 0855, 5-15-72 The Embassy of Chile was entered and all The offices Ransaked. Unknown what was Taken AT This time. Full Report To Follow Later.

CRU 244 Sgt Gill on scene.

Print CRU 735 on Scene

Off Leitz of E.P.S. Notified AT 1330 hrs.

OFFICE USE ONLY

	T.T. NUMBER	DATE & TIME THIS REPORT	37. DATE/TIME TYPE NO.	38. REPRODUCED BY
9591		5-15-72 1500		

39. REPORTING OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.	40. STATUS (Check One) ☐ UNFOUNDED ☒ OPEN ☐ CLOSED ☐ SUSPENDED	41. UNIT REFERRED TO	42. UCR DISPOSITION
M.S. Kurdilla 5D 3770			
43. SECOND OFFICER UNIT & BADGE NO.	44. SUPERVISOR APPROVING UNIT & BADGE NO.	45. REVIEWER	NO.
B.L. Dunning	Sgt C. O. Gill 147		00379

PD 251 REVISED 3/71 METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

OGC 73-0930
25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Identity 61 Break In on 15 May 1972

1. On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson, General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved in a break in at Identity 61 in Washington, D.C. on 15 May 1972. Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identified two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated 15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy, and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated 15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service. I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.

2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61 between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972.

Reported loss at tha[redacted]me consisted of four am/fm[redacted]adios and one electric razor. The police investigation identified some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints was made. Since the reported loss was under $5,000 and there was no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.

John K. Greaney

JOHN K. GREANEY
Assistant General Counsel

cc: Legislative Counsel
Inspector General

OGC:JKG:cav
Orig - Subject: Watergate Case
1 - JKG Signer
1 - Chrono

SECRET/SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

1 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

SUBJECT: Special Activities

1. Following our recent conversation, I have searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples of activities which to hostile observers or to someone without complete knowledge and with a special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding [CIA's charter.] JFK(1)(B)

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appearing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally, which I did. I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

3. As a result of a developing relationship with IDEN-122 the IDEN-123 representative in Washington, and also as a result of certain information conveyed by IDEN-124 , James Angleton, with the approval of Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the IDEN-95 in Washington. This involved breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

JFK 1(A)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

2.3 IMPDET CL BY 007789

00457

the IDEN-126 On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the operation without going into operational details. Later on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed. Actual breaking and entering occurred somewhat later, and on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy alone and briefed the President on the details of this new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney General was briefed and he agreed that he would not mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed. On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed reservations about the propriety of such an operation. He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June 1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the IDEN-95 be informed directly that we knew about their espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John F. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is no record that he had previously been made aware of this operation.

4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation. One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear installations. Outside the United States Government, General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

JFK (1)(B)

exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the effect that [CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy,] and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but knowledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests, offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly after this approach, IDEN-128 of IDEN-129 made a similar proposal to McCone in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, McCone injected [the Agency,] and particularly IDEN-36

JFK (1)(A)

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San Diego, 21 to 23 August 1972. The Students for a Democratic Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstration in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity from the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indication of North Vietnamese contact with the SDCC; such contact will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the Convention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris.

DEVELOPMENTS:

At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts, held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at the San Diego-Tijuana border during the Republican National Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be entertained.

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972, expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC, and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant solidarity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC write often and "send us materials you have."

2 3 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Republican Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego. Demonstrations organized by the San Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267, San Diego, Ca. 92103.

00557

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

14 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

28 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00560

26 JUL 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to take place at United States and allied military installations abroad during the period immediately before and during the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will participate in activities in connection with the Convention. The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization which has been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed at these meetings.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of foreign antiwar organizations, a representative of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an important position within that organization, discussed the plans of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that during the period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manufacture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and that similar actions will be organized at United States and allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representative further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

005S1

of the bombing in Vietnam are being organized by the "Republican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on 21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. (Comment: We have no present information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to travel to the United States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholm Conference representatives to participate in activities connected with the Republican Convention.)

The Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic group engaged in organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Convention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss the agenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. Although no information is presently available indicating that actions at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are scheduled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AWU advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials regarding the stance the AWU should take on certain questions relating to the presidential elections. It is also known that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party about the political mood in the United States. One of the AWU delegation members has stated that upon their return to the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television, to "educate the American people about the consequences of voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations at the Republican Convention will be "unique."

CONTROLLED DISSEM

2 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY:

There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire American delegation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG officials; at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972 for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American delegation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to discussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnamese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Republican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen Van TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention." TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demonstrators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

CLASSIFIED BY ______
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
impossible to determine

Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation, the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there is no information available concerning the substance of these private exchanges.

A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972 for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the AWU. This will be DAVIS' second trip to Paris within recent months for discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's chief target would be the Republican Convention.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

9 AUG 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

00585

CLASSIFIED BY

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY § 5B(1), (2), (3), or (4) ... AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

impossible to determine

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

There are no direct indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly,

under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13 July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican Conventions, but made no specific call for support of disruptive actions at the conventions themselves.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed, in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference member stated that these actions were part of an international campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate at the election conventions in July and August."

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was a major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's "Action Commission." The appendix called for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

23 MAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities in the United States against the war based on a submission by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ). The calendar includes actions planned in connection with the Democratic Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, who is also an influential and well-informed staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Conference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the April-May 1972 issue of its regular international publication Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and included the following entry:

July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami Beach. Demonstrations organised by Florida People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa, Florida 33612.

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.

7 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is an expression of interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations in the United States for demonstrations in connection with the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstrations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese official stated that he was especially interested in plans for actions in connection with the Democratic and National Conventions.

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CONTROLLED DISSEM

21 JUN 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

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into the US labor situation, and particularly to try to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany and Walter Reuther. IDEN-36 steered a very skillful course in this connection, but the Agency could be vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back, or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's wishes.

JFK DB

8. There are three examples of using Agency funds which I know to be controversial. One was the expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike Miskovsky IDEN-131, and James Smith. Second, as you well know, when Lou Concin received his summons to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on 1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him. My impression is that the accounting for this and its use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at one of the early Special Group meetings attended by McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His general position was that such expenditures were not within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow such spending only on the direct personal request of the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or the White House.

JFK DB

9. I raise these issues of funding because I remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000 for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.

10. Under the heading of old business, I know that any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried about the fact that conversations within the offices and over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's

tenure, there were microphones in his regular office, his inner office, his dining room, his office in East Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this score.

11. Also under the heading of old business, I well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs, and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was a special arrangement with the Office of Communications whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball, Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did. Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent several weeks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know, operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of his activities could be misunderstood. One example was his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135. Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action.

14. The use of IDEN-132 aircraft has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the San Francisco airport for the Republican National Convention in 1964 aboard the IDEN-133 with the highly visible tail number IDEN-134. This was, I explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate charter, but he didn't like it.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicative of the press's relations with him. However, in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things. They did not change a comma, and I doubt that this old saw will ever sing again.

16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.

17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight. If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point

out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinterpretation.

WElder
WALTER ELDER

SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR

JFK-(I)(C)

Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipulations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist, and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwing, radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embarrassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each case is cleared with the FBI and through CI/SO the Bureau is kept informed on a regular basis.

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6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational experience we have invited three FBI officers to be students in our Soviet Operations Course from 14 to 25 May 1973.

7. A Soviet defector was confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to September 1967 while efforts were being made to establish whether he was a bona fide defector. Although his present attitude toward the Agency is quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the press could cause undesirable publicity if it were to uncover the story.

JFK(1)(B)

David H. Blee
Chief
Soviet Bloc Division

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

Attached is the material we requested of Dick Ober:

A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Democratic National Convention

C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to Secret Service for Democratic and Republican Conventions

Ober advises that the only American we reported on to the IEC is Rennie Davis. BE (14 May 73)

(DATE)

JFK (1)(B)

00546

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1 AUG 54 (47)

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Inspector General		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Mr. Broe:

[Dick Ober] has been advised that this package is being sent to you. Since knowledge of the existence of this Committee has been strictly limited, I've asked that it be delivered to you unopened. Although it has an ER number on it, it has not been sent through that office -- I gave them only the day, subject, and originator. JFK(1)(B)

Barbara

00547

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/ES/MC/Barbara Pindar	15 May 73

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 1-67 237 Use previous editions (40)

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
[Richard Ober] w/SEC (? FBI)	1465	DATE 14 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. IDEN-73 O/DCI		File		Attached are:
2. Mr Colby				1. Background note on Committee per your request of this morning.
3.				2. Copies of memoranda concerning Agency support to Secret Service (7 April and 23 June 1972).
4.				
5.				
6.				EYES ONLY
7.				[illegible]
8.				[illegible]
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				00548
15.				

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EYES ONLY

14 MAY 1973

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970 to produce fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies, including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremism and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chairman); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of other Departments or Agencies (following have participated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later William Olson. IES has received requirements directly from and delivered reports directly to John Dean of the White House. The White House has insisted that the existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness of its existence within this Agency has been limited to DCI, DDO (DDP), C/CI and four officers of this office.

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign aspects (by memorandum with no Agency letterhead or attribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representative on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee Staff and as the alternate to the Agency representative on the Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information, November 1971. This study was initiated in July 1971 by the White House as a consequence of the President's concern about the release of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg. Both Robert Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency participation was editorial review.

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4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from February through August 1972 periodic contributions for these estimates concerning foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention (copies attached).

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July 1972): At the request of the White House, a series of estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disruptions at the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activities planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention (copies attached).

Attachments: a/s

23 FEB 1972

SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

1. There are only limited indications thus far of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972.

2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles, attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican National Convention. A representative of the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World Assembly to include a specific call for international support of activities against the Republican convention in their proposal to the Action Commission of the World Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indications that the proposal would be taken to the floor of the Assembly.

3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representative of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' representative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.) Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNON-supported project, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC), of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to direct New Left protest activities at the Republican National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam; it is not known if the Republican National Convention was discussed.

4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations.

21 MAR 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

Indications remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND:

At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for international support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

> "In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demonstrations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace, and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."

DEVELOPMENTS:

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a "large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72, which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles of people all over the world." Plans for activities at Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demonstrations."

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy in 1971 and 1972

1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in Washington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was discontinued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and identify this operation as CIA instigated.

2. The operation consisted of the following three technical devices:

a. An AC-powered, masked transmitter and two switches in the office occupied by the Deputy Chief of Mission.

b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the office of the Ambassador's secretary which was

designed to pick up high quality audio of typing in the office. It was hoped to break these audio signals into clear text using advanced computer techniques developed by Division D. No useful product, however, was ever obtained.

c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter and switch concealed in the door of the Embassy, which would supply crytographic information for NSA. (Produced excellent quality signals until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of battery failure.)

3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 government mission arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level talks with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the two countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December 1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting

JFK-1(B)

Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the mounting disclosures about CIA involvement in LDEN-76 This was especially so because of our reservations about maintaining proper security for the listening post which, as with other operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.

e. Alias Social Security Cards. 171 backstopped accounts have been established for contract personnel whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed but who are entitled to Social Security coverage. Following expiration of the contractual relationship, at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts are merged permitting the individual to receive complete benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility.

JFK (1)(B)

f. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security numbers have been registered for the purpose of opening 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 individual tax accounts have been established with IRS on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.

g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities (43 corporations; 61 sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers and 61 telephone answering service addresses are maintained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.

h. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliases for signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notional company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1 proprietary-hire as follows:

CCS/Hqs - 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8 proprietary entities and 1 notional company.

JFK (1)(B)

CCS/NY PMC* - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13 proprietary entities.

CCS/NY PMC* - 1 proprietary-hire (1 alias) on 3 proprietary entities.

CCS/MD PMC* - 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2 proprietary entities.

*Proprietary Management Company

sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirees are currently being handled.

k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Nonofficial Cover Personnel. Dividends (interest) earned on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based on 50 U.S. Code 403g or Internal Revenue Code Section 6041.

Individuals under cover may borrow money from the Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; however, the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).

Paragraph l. deleted because it contains sensitive Agency operational methods and techniques.

JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B)

PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic proprietary management companies which provide funding and operational support for 49 Agency entities, including 13 controlled and directed by CCS.

2. The three proprietary management companies are staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of entities supporting operations, and provide cover and funding channels for operational activities as required. Most importantly, professional services are furnished in a manner responsive to required security standards and at a cost considerably less than would be charged by bona fide management firms.

3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS provide cover for ten individuals in the United States and three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventory and aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government affiliation or interest.

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing the DCI

1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to identify to you for possible briefing of the Director activities which in certain contexts could be construed as delicate or inappropriate.

JFK (1)(B)

2. At the request of the Director of Security, from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January 1973 safesite number 583 was made available to the U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was under threat of assassination by organized criminal elements.

3. SB Division over the past three months has interviewed four graduate students as prospective candidates for assignments under American business cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate cover jobs on their own.

4. For approximately two years the SB Division has had the cooperation of the Commander of the Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police Department in training officers scheduled for assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The arrangement was made through the Office of Security.

JFK (1)(B)

5. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in response to requests from the FBI. We have shared with them through lectures and discussions lessons we have learned which are relevant to their counter-espionage responsibilities.

JFK (1)(A)

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have been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This collection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American "Movement" background or who have known connections with the American "Movement" are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been approximately 20 important areas of operational interest, which at the present time have been reduced to about ten: Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.

4. The MHCHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest.

Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive foreign operation.

Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive Agency foreign operation.

5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division. The control and retrievability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.

7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.

8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FR 73-183

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May 1973, same subject

1. The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?

Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be used as academic support assets and access agents. These Americans are used for spotting and assessment purposes only and do not perform any recruitments.

Paragraph l. b. and l. c. are deleted because they contain sensitive agency operational methods and techniques.

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d. Question: What is the arrangement re recruiting out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?

Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically requires approval by the ADDO or DDO for any recruitment attempt made in the United States against an American member of the academic community or a foreign target attending an American academic institution. This regulation is presently in the process of revision in that this approval authority for academic recruitments in the United States is to be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority for recruitment attempts against American students outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions at the present time are those precluding recruitment attempts against foreign students here in the United States on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.

2. If you have further questions, please let me know.

signed/IDEN-173

Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FR 73-180

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential

1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain somewhat greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

JFK(1)(B)

a. [The New York Base] provides a fairly considerable amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other than the inordinate amount of time spent by [New York Base] JFK(1)(B) personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of money that has been expended in support of these efforts.

b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep cover; [his cover is the Mullen Corporation.] [This is the corporation that employed E. Howard Hunt.] JFK(1)(B) In discussions between NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would be pulled out and reassigned in the United States. FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.

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We have concluded that the best solution is to have this officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least a year, working towards an advanced degree until there has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever during the period of time that he is attending the university. Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the situation and decide the next course of action at that time.

Paragraph l. c. is deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the existence of an audio operation done by the FBI [but with close TSD support] in San Francisco. This operation is directed against IDEN-62. I understand the operation has been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction with SB Division. JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B) JFK(1)(B)

e. Three microphones were planted in various locations in the IDEN-61 by the FBI. [The equipment was produced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no CIA personnel have entered the premises.] The operation was deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however, are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is unlikely the finger would point to CIA. JFK(1)(B)

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. A typical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement, however, I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d. In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87

to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as authorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum also states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:

a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by ~~Harry J. Murphy~~, Office of Security. The book was prepared by ~~Mr. Murphy~~ under a Brookings Institution Federal

JFK(1)(A)

the [DD/O,] we will not honor any requisition for surveillance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the [DD/O] JFK(1)(A)

4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:

JFK(1)(A)

a. In February 1971, [Colonel L. K. White,] the then Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby. Colonel White explained that the Technical Services Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance to the FBI for a sensitive project JFK(1)(A) . [Colonel White] did not disclose the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information concerning the mission or purpose of Project sub-stantive questions concerning the subject should be addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made, however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, approximately $1 million, and the complex technical equipment that has been involved in the undertaking.

b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reimbursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200 is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.

JFK(1)(B)

c. Over the years, this [Agency] has often supported other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supported by a transfer of funds, [the Agency] JFK(1)(B) would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or provide a service for, another Government agency when such

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators." It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of information that may be useful to an investigator. The book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967. Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made in September 1968. The title page of the book gives attribution to, Mr. Murphy, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential, and it is our understanding that the distribution was made to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if desired.

Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly determined that the LEAA request should not be honored because the Agency should not put itself in the position of publishing law enforcement material for general and unclassified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our printing facilities.

b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security requested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor vehicles for use in connection with a special support operation which would last approximately 3 months. The Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memorandum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.

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SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics

6. In connection with the responsibility held by this Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all Agency operating components, the following information is relevant.

a. A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 562" which is Iden 88 was made available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971.

The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970 as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site and in keeping with the approved requirement for a complement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use. The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older high-rise building along Iden 89. The nominal lessee is Iden 90 a security-cleared attorney with offices located at Iden 91. The cover story utilized is that Iden 90, rents the apartment for business conferences, meetings, and occasional overnight stays by his staff and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term was for a 1-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971, with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency components to meet their short-term or crash requirements. Control of the standby safe site and its security is the responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of each user, component, and date of use; however, no record is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.). Such information is maintained by the operating component requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971 in answer to a telephonic request.

JFK(C)

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering

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00115

assistance in connection with the political conventions that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant operating component on this matter.

7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

2 Atts

cc: DD/M&S

EYES ONLY
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EYES ONLY

Requesting Office	Date of Request	Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Receiving U.S. Department or Agency
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,350	BNDD
TSD	5/16/72	Transmitters, Radio Beacon	8	313	BNDD
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzer	1	1,350	White House Communications Agency
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	13	1,400	Air Force
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	10	1,350	State
OS	3/23/72	Telephone Analyzers	2	1,375	AEC
TSD	11/16/72	Camera Sets	20	656	FBI
TSD	4/17/72	Camera Sets	10	700	FBI
TSD	11/18/71	Actuators, Recorders	50	488	FBI
TSD	4/19/72	Tessina Cameras	3	700	BNDD
TSD	12/ 7/72	Camera, Video	1	18,045	FBI
TSD	10/13/72	Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,639	FBI
TSD	3/26/71	Tubes, Image, W L 30691	2	4,607	FBI
TSD	4/20/73	Cameras, Television	2	18,300	FBI

00113

EYES ONLY

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JFK(A)

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EYES ONLY

Requesting Office	Date of Request	Item	Quantity	Unit Cost	Receiving U.S. Department or Agenc
TSD	12/14/72	Transmitters, Radio	3	313	BNDD
TSD	10/20/72	Actuators, Recorder	25	591	FBI
TSD	10/13/72	Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Equivalent of W L 30691	1	4,639	FBI
TSD	5/26/71	Tube, Image, W L 30691	2	4,639	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Transmitters	3	1,372	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Module, Plug-In	1	1,247	FBI
TSD	4/22/71	Power Supply - UWP-39A	1	568	FBI
OL	2/25/71	Telephone Analyzers	2	1,350	Treasury
OS	1/30/71	Telephone Analyzers	22	1,350	Treasury
OL	8/12/70	Cable, Special-Purpose Electrical	5,000 ft.	.42	White House Communication Agency
TSD	1/10/73	Ink, Special Formula	1 lot	1,825	Immigration a Naturalizatio Service
TSD	6/28/72	Ink, Special Formula	1 lot	3,700	Immigration a Naturalizatio Service
TSD	7/26/71	Transmitter, Radio Beacon	1	728	U.S. Forestry

EYES ONLY
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EYES ONLY

JFK (1A) OJCS-594-73
11 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Activities which might be considered sensitive issues.

I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which might be considered sensitive issues.

Most Sensitive Projects

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
~~HYDRA~~	Richard Ober CI Staff Red 1465	A special project initiated by DCI	Type of data being collected.
~~SANCA~~	Iden 48 OS Red 9298	Machine index to security files	Type of data in index.
~~ORDSTAT~~	~~John Hutchings~~ ORD 3061	Information storage & retrieval of drug related data (~~ORD~~'s project ~~OFTEN~~)	Type of data in files.

JFK (1B) JFK (1B)

Sensitive Projects

~~DRUGGS~~	Iden 18 OMS 7792	Computer file of drug data.	Type of data in file.

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Sensitive Projects (Continued)

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
~~PROFILES~~	~~John Winnie~~ TSD 362-1922 (sterile)	Statistical analysis of psychological data.	Source of data. Contractors are involved with project.

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern

~~TILAQ~~	~~Robert Hahn~~ SB Red 1185/ 1251	Pattern analysis of surveillance data from foreign liaison service	Nature of data. Techniques of system discussed with FBI.
~~SPYDER~~	~~George Swegman~~ OS 5071	Data on radio frequencies used for support of ~~In-Place~~ Monitoring System, a system to identify unauthorized transmitters.	Project originated by James McCord.
~~DMVREC~~	Iden 48 OS Red 9298	File of automobile license numbers.	Nature of data.
~~APREGIN~~	Walter Kowalski CI Staff Red 9338	File of Agency applicants who were not hired.	Nature of data.

EYES ONLY

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00133

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)

OJCS Project Identification	Project Officer Organization, & Telephone	Nature of Project	OJCS Reason for Listing
--	Iden 187 ISD/DDO Red 1442	Cooperative program with Iden 188	Association with the named organization.
		in name grouping techniques.	

For

JOHN D. IAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support

23 2557

29 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Mr. Colby's Request to Inspector General to Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes in a PP/B Memo to DD/M&S

REFERENCE : D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973, Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect Involvement

JFK(1)(B)

1. The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mr. Colby asked that DDO records be checked.

2. DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a project called Iden 99. This is a joint operation with the Iden 100 service for the collection of ~~ELINT~~ intelligence. The activity is handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff.

3. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to CI on 13 January 1972. It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount, i.e., $30 to 32K and not to two separate allocations.

JFK(1)(A) [John C. Richards]
John C. Richards

00145

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Executive Registry
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25-81

May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Watergate Principals - Direct or Indirect Involvement

1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for a report of any involvement in any capacity since 1 January 1969 with Messrs. Hunt, McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.

3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime during the late 1960's when I was Director, Office of Computer Services. I opposed plans for Technical Division, Office of Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for Iden 101. Ted Hines of DD/S&T (then ORD) was the computer individual working with TD and, I think, would have details.

4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his request, first through OMB, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control. Individual phone discussions are noted in the attached. The Agency focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3; I understand Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached also.

5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will not be available until tomorrow.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs
Director of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - W. E. Colby
1 - D/PPB Eyes Only File
O/PPB/CAB:[illegible]

Attachment
As stated

00149

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E2 IMPDET CL BY [illegible]

Attachment
23 May 1973

4 Feb 72 — Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud" Krogh and his deputy, Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the travel.

7 Feb 72 — Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips for 3 individuals--all in FY 72. Cost probably $10K. Minnick ready to make first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran visit.

7 Feb 72 — See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Colby (2 Aug 72).

12(?) May 72 — John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/Minnick attendance at a Latin American Iden 102 conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd, White House, was laying on a trip with Iden 32 for himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Europe.

23 Jun 72 — Iden 3 commented on Krogh/Minnick interest in getting CA activities, including large-scale PM, on narcotics front. Iden 3 pushing small-scale PP.

6 Jul 72 — Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film. We will send."

2 Aug 72 — Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel orders ready; need money this PM (No record in my notes as to who was traveling when, but have faint recollection of its being to Mexico City). Sam Hines and Iden 73 contacted by Iden 3.

1 Nov 72 — Related? Iden 3 call. Again notes are cryptic: WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32): Survey DNDD problems/Mexico."

00150

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On Mr. Colby's copy only:

JFH (1)(B)

13 Jan 72	ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30K for sensitive CS project - no details.
20 Jan 72	Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.

19 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with [Jack Bauman] JFK(1)(A)

JFK(1)(A)

1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I dropped in to see [Jack Bauman] who lives in Winterhaven, Florida. [Jack] retired from [the Agency] about five years ago on disability due to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for about 20 years prior to his retirement.

JFK(1)(A)

2. During a private conversation [Jack] told me that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the [McCord-Hunt] affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed, and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security Officer for the Republican Party. [Jack] visited Washington in January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. [Jack] furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him. Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in such activity.

JFK(1)(A)

3. According to [Jack] during the meeting with Mr. Hunt they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program and a need for a good security system both before and during the National Convention. [Jack] indicated that he sincerely believed that the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a problem.

CLASSIFIED BY 0376-16 00153

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY: § 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more) AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Impossible to Det (unless impossible, insert date or event)

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

4. When Jack declined, he indicated that Mr. Hunt asked for any other recommendations he might have. According to Jack he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the Agency, but he did furnish the name of IDEN-108 who might be possibly ready to retire from the Agency.

5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, Jack said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.

6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impression from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as originally reported.

7. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr. Bauman, and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record and for information of the Director of Security.

Charles W. Kane

CONFIDENTIAL

EYES ONLY

00153

DD/M&S 73-1809

1 of 3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter

JFK(A)

1. I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the proper format to do so.

JFK(A)

2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In December 1971 Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call. I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message. I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record prepared by Iden 17 as a result of our conversation.

JFK(A)

3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE [illegible] SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

EYES ONLY SECRET

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with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the memorandum is attached.

4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related matters now receiving attention in the press.

JFK (1)(B)

Charles W. Kane
Special Assistant to the
Deputy Director
for Management and Services

JFK (1)(A)

Atts

EYES ONLY SECRET

17 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Charles W. Kane - JFK(1)(A)
Iden 108

1. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI contacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests of this nature were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the subjects.

2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on the "Watergate" case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry. Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that the Bureau does not wish to interview them.

4. The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 in the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interviewed.

5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July. I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.

6. Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned

by the fact that Mr. Kane accompanied a technical sweep team to the Montevideo station. Mr. Kane stated further that around Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels whereupon he passed the number on to Mr. Bauman.

7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may have obtained his name from him.

signed Iden 17

Deputy Director of Security

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

a. CI Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists, etc.

b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American Medical Association records.

c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.

2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).

3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103 for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction System."

b. DDS&T/ORD's Project which involved the collection of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms terminated this program last Fall.

CONFIDENTIAL E-2

1[illegible] May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Research Project on Robert Vesco

JFK (1)(A)

1. On 16 October 1972 [Messrs.] Breckinridge and [Heintzelman], in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the Atlantic/Pacific Division of the Office of Economic Reports. One project cited was a query from the Director, apparently at the request of Secretary Shultz, to the effect, "What do we know about Vesco," the man then running IOS. Two of OER's analysts were assigned to the project and, working through the Domestic Contact Service, spent a day going over the files of the Securities and Exchange Commission. There apparently was some contact also with EUR Division of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current Intelligence.

2. The information above is based on rough notes and obviously is sketchy. It is cited now not to suggest any wrongdoing but because of the current publicity about Vesco and the probability of continuing probes into the subject by the press and the courts.

Scott D. Breckinridge

JFK (1)(A) [H. Henry Heintzelman]

00173

22 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Bill--

Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:

1. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68, Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).

This document was produced in two versions--one with the chapter on radical students in America (pages 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow, and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the other version without the references to the American scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the Agency. This document without the material on the US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General in March 1969.

2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969), No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).

3. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look (12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 98).

Please note that these are our record copies and should be returned.

I-A
4/10/75
A.S.H.

Edward W. Proctor
Edward W. Proctor
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

00171

JFK(DA)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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CIA

[redacted]

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside [CIA's Legislative Charter]

JFK(1)(b)

1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's legislative charter.

2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate have reviewed the past and present activities of their components. I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two improper activities:

<u>Hunt</u>: Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation of a recommendation in support of the Agency's nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National Civil Service League Award.

<u>Mitchell</u>: While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCI officer was assigned the task of providing him with daily briefings on <u>foreign</u> developments.

[redacted]

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Young: Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS had frequent contacts with Young during the summer of 1972 in connection with Executive Order 11652 and the implementing NSC directive. This involved visits by Young to CIA to discuss information storage and retrieval and several meetings of an inter-agency group dealing with the implementation of the Executive Order and directive.

3. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders. Their responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be viewed as borderline.

- DCS collects information on foreign students studying in the US.
- DCS collects information on physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign nationals).
- DCS accepts information on possible foreign involvement in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and BNDD directly.
- DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of US citizens to cooperate with CIA.
- DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973, was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls.
- Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.
- NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify photography too "sensitive" for public release.

- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil disturbances.

- OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with the US anti-war movement and world-wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.

- CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to the Soviet, and occasionally other foreign, embassies to acquire positive foreign intelligence.

- FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work directly for another agency, e.g., to the FBI to translate Arabic in Washington.

- FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports covered by copyright. These are circulated within the Government and stamped "Official Use Only". This has gone on for three decades without problems.

- FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda, and Ramsey Clarke.

- FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service under Department of Commerce cover since 1957. JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of unclassified publications in foreign languages and contracts with private individuals to do this work. Most of these individuals are not witting of the CIA-JPRS relationship.

EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

[redacted]

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

JFK (1)(6)

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states. Two DDI memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970). In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.

2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to write a memorandum with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The record is not clear where this request originated, but it came through channels from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially sensitive and was to include material provided by the Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between militant blacks in the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced in typescript form and given to the DCI.

267

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CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652 exemption category:
5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
[illegible]
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

00183

JFK(1B)

3. For several months in the first half of 1968 the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only, although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET/SENSITIVE

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

JFK(1)(B)

To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f (1) of providing operational support within the US to all elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if misinterpreted. For example:

1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and officials.

2. Identify foreign students in the US through collection of foreign student lists from certain universities.

3. Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens to determine their suitability and willingness to cooperate with the Agency.

4. Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA credentials.

5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a passive manner and only when the source has refused to pass the information directly to the FBI.

6. Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again only in a passive manner when the source has refused to pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.

00187

SECRET/SENSITIVE

E2 IMPDET CL BY 004176

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

JFK(1)(C)

7. Collect specific information and supply duplicate or master keys for foreign hotels.

8. Collect medical information from cooperative contacts on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment or examinations in the US.

9. Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were foreign nationals, some were US. The taped information included school, present business address, date of birth, and specialty.

10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas telephone calls between persons in the US and persons overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted for approximately six months but has ceased.

11.

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.

JAMES R. MURPHY
Director, Domestic Contact Service

SECRET
EYES ONLY

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of worldwide student dissidence. Confronted by timult at campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes; financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences hostil to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.

2. The paper was prepared by [Paul Corscadden] of OCI with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI, D/OCI, and [Corscadden] met with Rostow to elicit the reasons for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed, etc.

JFK (AD)

3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two sections. The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, histor, and tactics. This section drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense, the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page) typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's request in December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)

00133

JFK (RA)

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Classified by 005820
Exempt from general declassification schedule

4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which then monopolized the field of student action here and abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself as a review of foreign student dissidence.

5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be in the Johnson Library.

6. Following the paper's favorable reception by the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.

7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in September 1968 and then updated and issued again in March 1969 and August 1970.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

SC 03289/73

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD), Office of Communications, Operational Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

JFK(1)(B)

1. Prior to 1969 the [OC COMINT intercept unit,] which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support to these activities in monitoring, identification and DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made through the [DDO's Chief, WH, Miami.]

JFK(1)(A)

2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division [D/DDO,] requested that the Special Programs Division initiate a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America. The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of the availability of personnel and technical capabilities, the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92 Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily intercepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage was terminated by Division D because of possible legal complications.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal technical liaison with operating components of the FBI for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements for support of specific activities have been made by the Division [D/DDO.] Support has been provided in the form of

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

E2 IMPDET CL BY [061947]

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

JFK(1)(A)

Downgraded to Secret on 6/17/16 per Auto declass guide 7135451780

00140

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment. In the past several years, support has been rendered to sensitive FBI projects MOHAWK, UNION and MUGRAVEL. Support has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID and ROSE. These projects are described in the attached sealed envelope.

4. An operational test of an NSA-developed HF/DF system was jointly conducted by NSA, Division D/DDO and OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972. A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the tests because of similarity to the actual target site and environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site. A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the roof. A team member in effect told him that the group was an advance security segment for the Democratic National Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests were completed and the equipment was returned to the Washington area.

signed Iden 53

Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

Att.

Downgraded to secret on 6/7/16 [illegible] declass guide J13J45780

9 May 1973

~~MOHAWK~~ - Electronic survey of Iden 63. This operation was terminated approximately two months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for two days.

~~UNION~~ - Iden 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by the Iden 94 . Embassy on their diplomatic communication link. SPD/SEO support terminated two years ago.

~~ORKID~~ - Electronic surveillance of Iden 64 Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning at this time, (attendance at two meetings).

~~ROSE~~ - Electronic surveillance of Iden 62 ____ . SPD/CMT personnel performed an electronic search of the Iden 62 __ area and SPD/SEO personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording of the spectrum covering .1 to .6 GHz during the period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for continued support by SPD in the future as requested.

~~WU~~GRAVEL - Division D operation involving a Iden 95 code clerk. SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in use of device and stood by in Iden 97, Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed. The operation took place in July 1972.

~~TOP~~ SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS

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~~...~~ 3J5780

TOP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

JFK (1)(A)

1. In late 1967 [OCI] participated in the preparation of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the foreign connections of US organizations and activists involved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of these reports, prepared at the request of the White House, was to determine whether any links existed between international Communist elements or foreign governments and the American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between anti-war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of direction or formal coordination.

JFK (1)(B)

2. In October 1967 President Johnson expressed interest in this subject and ordered a high level interdepartmental survey. In response to his personal request to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the [CI Staff to collect whatever information was available through our own sources and through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the President.]

3. [A book message requirement was sent to all stations to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this subject.] Although agent reports on Communist front operations overseas were of some value, the primary source of information on the activities of US activists--and that was quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA, which had been similarly tasked by the White House.

JFK (1)(B)

Downgraded to secret on 6/7/16 per auto declass guild J13745780

TOP SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY

JFK (1)(A)

Classified by [illegible]
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. [illegible] exemption category:
[illegible]

00133

4. A draft memorandum was jointly prepared by OCI and CI Staff and forwarded to the DCI. He passed this typescript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the President personally. The White House copy is now in the files of President Johnson's papers at the library in Austin.

5. Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and forwarded to the White House on 21 December and 17 January 1968. According to our best recollection, no further finished intelligence reports on international connections of the peace movement were produced.

Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

JFK(1)(C)

1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's request for a listing of any questionable involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable man could construe as improper.

2. CRS does, of course, have several programs to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes and books either privately, secretly or without acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user. CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking at the content of film cans addressed to the Russian Embassy in Washington. Customs occasionally also provides access to other film from denied areas. It may be addressed to private citizens or organizations or other embassies. These efforts are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign information.

3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The biographic file-building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge, only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of the opposition leader of Guyana and the other is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we have no way to separate them; we have files on U.S. defectors to Cuba.)

SECRET JFK(1)(A)

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 004050

00137

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

JFK (1B)

4. The CIA Library has several informal snag files intended to aid the librarians in answering the kinds of questions that they know they will get on a continuing basis. An appointments file is a collection of clippings on appointed federal officials: who holds what job when and what is his background? The extremist files are a collection of folders on a variety of organizations and a few people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these particular files. And a few persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver, have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clippings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground, scholarly.

5. I am not aware of any other kind of involvement in domestic activities that is not related to development of techniques or logistics or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service

JFK (2A)

3 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDI

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities

JFK(1)(B)

1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg and Watergate cases.

2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency transmissions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel, and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's NCNA, are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restriction. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house, correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright, e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news

JFK (17b)

agency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently, however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of those items vital to the government's business which we must continue to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against the risk of present procedures.

4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American POW's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam. At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion submitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such cases, we have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved, presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses. (In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently taking a second look.

E. H. Knoche

E. H. KNOCHE
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

SECRET

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

SUBJECT : TSD Support to Other Agencies

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.

4. In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.

5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.

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This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.

JFK1(B)

8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.

Sidney Gottlieb
Chief
Technical Services Division

Attachment
Distribution:
O & 1 - Addressee, w/att

00216

ATTACHMENT

JFK (1)(C)

Department of Defense

Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing, flaps and seals; counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department of Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requests are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas. In turn these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type cases.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

JFK (1)(B)

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices, SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau. All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate. Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

JFK (1)(B)

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in developing tamperproof alien registration cards, special fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if operational.

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Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and exposure of black letter operations against the United States abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports, foreign visas and in the past passports on a priority basis.

Postal Service

JFK (1B)

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has been furnished foreign postal information and has been the recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office has furnished TSD with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secret Service

JFK (1B)

Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.

U. S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the

request of CI/PG. Trainees represent internal security or national police from all countries participating in AID Police assistance programs.

White House

Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.

Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and Alexandria

During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio, locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Centeral Intelligence and in turn validation was required for each course from the Director of Security.

SE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:	EXTENSION	NO.
Sidney Gottlieb Chief, TSD 203 South Building	x-2831	DATE 8 May 1973

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. DDS&T				Attached herewith are additional explanations of TSD support to other U.S. Government agencies.
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				SECRET-EYES ONLY
9.				
10.				
11.				
12.				
13.				
14.				00220
15.				

FORM 3-62 610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

ATTACHMENT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were involved in operations:

(A) Identity 59 - Four masked transmitters were installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.

(B) Identity 60 - A TSD built masked transmitter was installed to collect emanations from a cryptographic machine. The system continues to function when samples of the emanations are needed.

(C) Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been installed and are operating. One is specifically designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the other is a straight audio transmitter to collect conversations. A FBI agent is manning the listening post. A third system is not operating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape made from this room was made by the National Security Agency before failure.

(D) Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and consultation covering Identity 62 . First masked switched transmitters were used in two apartments used as temporary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters and microwave transmitters were installed in the permanent quarters along with mic and wire installations, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived.

JFK (1)(B)

(E) Iden 64 - This is an operation with additional participation by National Security Agency. It is designed in anticipation of the Identity 64 in Washington. The listening post was obtained by using the Agency covert mechanisms for procuring the property. New systems are being designed and produced by using TSD's covert contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.

(F) Identity 65 - Ten masked audio devices purchased from TSD were installed in Identity 65

by the FBI. Part of the equipment was installed in November and December 1971, the remaining equipment was installed 17 - 25 March 1972. Tests made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that the target equipment no longer functioned and was believed discovered by the occupants.

(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and audio surveillance operations which might not be known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a relatively unsophisticated device was used against a domestic target.

SECRET

TSD/SDB Memo #138-73

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD

ATTENTION: Executive Officer

SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations

JFK (1)(b)

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the training came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.

2. On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiarization to police officers of several domestic police departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These techniques had been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB officers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete information on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

/s/ Identity 120

C/TSD/OPS/SDB

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SECRET

73-2330

JFK(1)(B)

ORD-2328-73
9 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

JFK(1)(B)

SUBJECT : Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities

JFK(1)(B)

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined with respect to all ORD services or dealings with other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. In addition, this report covers all our activities dealing with the research and development of intelligence equipment for foreign use which has been tested in the United States and might have collected domestic information. Again, each member of ORD available today was asked either directly or through his supervisor to provide the above requested information, whether he was directly involved or not. We have used all diligence to search our records available to us during this time period to ensure this is a complete and factual list.

for Sayre Stevens
Director of Research & Development

Attachments:
1 - Contacts with Other Government Agencies
2 - Domestic Tests

JFK 1(A)

CLASSIFIED BY 357323

SECRET

00223

CONTACTS WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICH COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Executive Office of the President

[ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics Control that is concerned with research support of the narcotics control problem.]

(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST) (Cianci/LS)

Office of Telecommunications Policy

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information was exchanged with them.

(Noe/TA)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)

Techniques and equipment for navigation and tracking was discussed with BNDD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dewerker/TA) (Noe/TA)

Technical information was exchanged relating to the development of simple, portable sensor systems for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and narcotic laboratory effluents.

(Mr. John Gunn and Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD) (Parker/DSP)

Audio tapes were processed to improve their intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Scott/An)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

BNDD (cont'd)

[BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972 to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD.]

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) Identity 125 /LS)

A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed for the detection of narcotics for application in Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of the instrument.

(Dr. Laster/OST) (Terek/LS)
(Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD)

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee

Continuing contacts were maintained with the intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange of information, reports, and equipment has been conducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and Navy.

(Noe/TA)
(Noyes/PD)

State Department

Two contracts for development of countermeasures techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.

(Noe/TA)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

JFK (1)(B)

Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and devices. These Laboratories have used sampling techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuclear plant releases.

(Mr. B. Benson, AEC) (Walker/DSP)

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction detector.

(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC) (Noyes/PD)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)

JFK (1)(B)

Reports and information about the ORD-developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System were made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

(Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA) Identity 125 /LS)

Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information were exchanged with LEAA.

(Noe/TA)

JFK (1)(B)

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Treasury

JFK (1)(A)

Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug enforcement administration. The request for his services was made by Identity 3, the Agency's Narcotics Coordinator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the detailing through Mr. Colby.

(Leahy/LS)

Customs/Treasury Department

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over the U.S.-Mexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs) (Lawrence/DSP)

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/IRS

JFK (1)(B)

About five years ago, assistance was requested in domestic search of "moonshine" stills using CIA infrared scanners. This was turned down.

(Lawrence/DSP)

Secret Service

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques and equipment.

(Van Dewerker/TA)

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SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems -

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)

The results of our research work in the detection of metals (NOLIR) were reported to FAA for possible use in the detection of hijacker weapons.

(MacAnlis/RP)

National Institute of Health (NIH)

JFK (1)(b)

At the request of ORD, OCS assigned a staff technician to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was done in cooperation with NIH.

(Ms. Coniver, NIH) Identity 125 /LS)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

JFK (1)(b)

LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order to structure ORD's BW/CW research programs to support ACDA needs.

Identity 125 /LS)

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Technical information relating to detection of radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with them.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA) (Walker/DSP)

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SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

EPA (cont'd)

Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land fill have been conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA) (Risinger/DSP)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

(Stephan/IPA)

Secret Service
FBI
U.S. Customs

Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs.

(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS) (Noyes/PD)
(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)

We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA) (Galinaitis/IPA)
(Mr. Leonard Jaffe, NASA)
(General Smart)

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SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Proposed Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association would be SECRET)

JFK (1)(B)

[The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experimental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat crop. A part of the information would be obtained from a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-truth data will be collected on North American crops.]

(Briglia/PAS)

U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

JFK (1)(B)

[CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium poppies.]

(Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA) (Lawrence/DSP)
(Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD) (Cianci/LS)

Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force, Office of the Inspector General
Army, Office of Provost Marshall General

We have exchanged technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security information with them.

(Noe/TA)

U.S. Army
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Toelle Ordnance Depot

JFK (1)(B)

[LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing, storage and production facilities in the U.S.]

(Identity 125/LS)

00235

SECRET

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

JFK(1)(B)

U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal

[LS/ORD] is sharing expenses with EA in field testing an IR remote detector of CW aerosols.

Identity 125 /LS)

JFK(1)(B)

U.S. Navy

[BSD/ORD] turned over about eight trained dolphins to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued our dolphin program.

(Lynch/LS)

JFK (1)(B)

U.S. Coast Guard

About six years ago [CIA infrared equipment was made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means for night search of life boats.]

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG) (Lawrence/DSP)

JFK (1)(B)

Identity 174 Sheriff's Office

[ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants. Polygraph security findings were compared with the Sheriff's own security findings.]

(Sheriff) Identity 125 /LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assessment methods in 1967-68.

(Sheriff) Identity 125 /LS)

00236

SECRET

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic Problems

Chief, San Francisco Police

For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate Chinese social groups. (1967)

(Police Chief) Identity 125/LS)

JFK (RB)

DOMESTIC TESTS FOR AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

1. As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the research and development of equipment and techniques for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we conduct experiments and tests in the United States. Clearly, the design and development of our intelligence equipments can be done more economically and more securely in this country. Although most of the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating the foreign environment, some of the tests and experiments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

2. A review of the surveillance equipment or techniques which have at some time or other been exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in San Francisco under very closely controlled conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed portions of the test. Recordings that were made of laser probe output were carefully controlled as classified material and it is believed that the tapes have long since been destroyed. (Wood/TA)

b. Microwave Intercept System - About 1968, this system was tested in a light aircraft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station in Identity 127, California. This system is designed to permit intercept of microwave telephone communication channels of systems such as Identity 130. It works equally well against the Bell Telephone TD-2, as they are generically the same. Recordings of these telephone intercepts were carefully controlled and were destroyed several years ago.

SECRET

ATTACHMENT 2

00238

JFK (1)(b)

c. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objective of this current program is to develop a means to utilize foreign telephone systems as a communication link without the knowledge of the host system. In order to carry out this objective, it is necessary to learn the complete supervisory signalling and sequencing control system hierarchy for the various foreign telephone systems. Many of these are patterned after the U.S. system and, for this reason, limited monitoring to test the operation of intercept equipment in the United States is planned. The data to be collected would be merely the signal tones from which supervisory codes can be extracted. Message content is of no interest and will not be recorded. Overseas testing is planned at a subsequent date. To date, some domestic testing of this concept has been carried out at the contractor's plant. No recordings have been made of such data. Extremely brief tests exercising U.S. and foreign telephone systems through supervisory tone signalling have been carried out to verify initial concepts. The duration of testing was less than one-half hour.

d. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of engineering development tests of special sensors within the United States include infrared and high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR (FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial effluent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magnetometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks). In all these cases, the data output of such testing has been used for engineering development and the content has been restricted to dissemination to those in Government involved with the engineering design.

SUBJECT: Domestic Tests for Agency Research and Development Efforts

JFK (10B)

e. Remote Physiological Measurements - An ORD-developed cryogenic magnetometer is being tested at a contractor's site for use as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph). Some test subjects are witting, but most tests are on naive subjects (they do not know they are being tested). The magnetometer is completely harmless to the subject and the test results are closely held.

f. Personality Structure of Defectors Study - ORD undertook to determine the personality structure of defectors during the period 1966-69. The work primarily involved an analysis of the open literature on known defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned with a study of the phenomenon of defection itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another, or changing one set of political beliefs for another. The work was conducted at Stanford University. Identity 125/LS)

g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained and tested in the United States to carry small intelligence collecting packages such as audio surveillance devices, small cameras, and current measuring devices. Any data collected from unwitting domestic sources would have been used only for engineering purposes and then destroyed.

h. Communications Link Loading Study - In the period from 1970 through 1972 various means were used to check out an intercept system designed to operate against Iden 93 communications links. Under carefully controlled conditions, some U. S. microwave communications were recorded and passed through the intercept system under test to prove quality of performance. All intercept material connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks of the time of intercept and the material was never checked for substantive content. NSA participated and controlled most elements of the U. S. material.

SECRET

JFK (1)(B)

[ORD-2274-73]

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities

At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief or his representative was instructed to query all of his people and report back by this afternoon whether or not they had provided any services or dealt with any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. The attached list is an inventory of all items we were able to uncover. If additional information on any of these topics is desired, we can provide either a verbal or a written report on very short notice.

JFK (1)(A)

[Charles E. McGinnis]
Charles E. McGinnis
Scientific Advisor
to
Director of Research & Development

Attachment:
As stated

CLASSIFIED BY 387323
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1) (2)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

SECRET

00241

JFK(1)(B)

[Project TAMPER, an on-going program which may be politically sensitive.]

A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be politically sensitive.

JFK (1)(B)

[Narcotics--our foreign activities are well known in DDS&T.]

A negative report from the Support Staff.

JFK (1)(A)

[ORD's NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge.]

Robert Scott - Performed intelligibility enhancement of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

James M. Stephan - At the request of FBI, we described Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing distortions from some photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request for specific support in processing the imagery was turned down.

SECRET

7 May 197

C. V. NOYES

My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance with domestic operations has been in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Specifically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings which included technology exchanges and some equipment exchanges on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial. I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening (date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.

Other persons contacted over the years have been:

Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service

Mr. Martin Pera, U. S. Customs

Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA

Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI

Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF

Major John Langager, ONI/USN

Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC

SECRET

Thomas P. Noe
5/7/73

1. Continuing contacts with intelligence community regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and physical security. (This is an exchange of information and reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.)

State	Navy
Air Force	US Secret Service
Army	NSA
DIA	
FBI	

2. Joint funding of two contracts with State Department (TRW/LLL). Two electret microphones were furnished to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD contract (Bureau of Standards).

3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information collection or exchange only.

ARPA

LEAA/Dept. of Justice

DNA/DOD

Office Telecommunications Policy

Office of Army/Provost Marshal General

Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon

Air Force/Office of the Inspector General

Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

SECRET

7 May 1973

LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

JFK(B)

1. BNDD(Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action was approved by D/ORD.

2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the Navy. Time: December 1969

3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System. Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control.

00243

SECRET

29 MAY 1973

JFK (1)(b)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Reported Identity 61 Burglary

1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the reported break-in of Identity 61. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.

2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio operation conducted against Identity 61 by the FBI, at the Agency's behest and with its technical support. This presents a related question that should be noted. James McCord's testimony indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity 61. He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield, says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure" they "were subjects of national security wiretaps."

3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the Identity 75, run by the FBI, about which CI Staff believes McCord knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation against Identity 61, and assumed that it was also a telephone tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive operations. At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in, and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations may lead to exposure of the operations.

William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Inspector General

00361

Attachment:
As Stated Above

(unless impossible, insert date or event)

24 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Reported Burglary of the Identity 61

1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61 13-14 May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked and a number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it determined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61 registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed, Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject. There had been an earlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61 which is described below.

2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency proposed to the FBI the installation of technical coverage of Identity 61 The opportunity for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid for a contract to renovate Identity 61 Upon securing the contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community was cited.

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms sent a letter to Attorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.

00382

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the technical equipment from the Agency to the FBI was delivered, installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency personnel were involved in any way with actual installation of equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency technicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did they enter Identity 61.

JFK (1)(b)

5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 be stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover advised that he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61 was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972 when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76 delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on nationalization of foreign holdings. While the FBI was still in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible coverage of Identity 61 and on 22 December 1972 coverage was partially reinstituted with full coverage in effect by 26 December 1972.

JFK (1)(b)

6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was not worth continuing. On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued.

John C. Richards
John C. Richards

Addendum [redacted]ferred to in JCRichards' 24[redacted]v 73 memo to IG, paragraph 2, re Identity 61 Break-in

1. The Foreign Resources Division asset was Identity 77 who owned the Identity 78

. The Agency had initially agreed to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500. The final amount of remuneration turned out to be $4,828.53. Another FR asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79 plumber and elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.

2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening post were: Identity 80, Identity 30 and Identity 45 of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D.

00368

VIII. Coordination

A. Internal

JFK(1)(B)

In developing its cadre of general support assets and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact with the [Domestic Contact Service] of the Directorate for Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever possible to support FR's operational activities. To a more limited degree, FR Bases maintain contacts with Office of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives, pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by these officers and using their entre to specific individuals who can provide access to targets of operational interest.

B. External

FR officers in the field maintain coordination with their FBI counterparts. There is limited cooperation with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are of occasional help in operations involving other nationals. The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on occasion provided backstopping on cases where there was some flap potential.

Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between the Agency and the FBI dated 7 February 1966.

The Bases also have contact with local Immigration and Naturalization Service offices although these contacts are less frequent and less important than the contacts with the FBI offices.